The chill winds of competition should have favorable effects on industrial efficiency according to the neoclassical paradigm. Leibenstein (1966) was the first to state explicitly that "proper motivations" should discipline firms, forcing them to become more efficient or perish. Many industries-such as trucking, air travel, and banking-have faced one such motivational factor: reduced regulation. In a study of the U.S. airline industry, for example, Alam and Sickles (2000) find support for the hypothesis that resource utilization in the industry became more efficient as market forces compelled the airlines to economize after the 1978 deregulation. Similarly, finds that the U.S. banking industry, which underwent substantial deregulation and notable financial innovations during the 1980s, experienced sustained productivity growth during most of that decade.
In the international arena one motivational factor is the heightened competition arising because countries have adopted trade liberalization strategies, the most conspicuous examples being the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Economic Community (EEC). In the case of developing countries several empirical studies have confirmed a positive link between trade reform and efficiency, yet many researchers continue to have doubts about the impact of trade liberalization on performance.
1 Despite the intuitive appeal of the efficiency hypothesis, empirical studies have been limited in part by the scarcity of plant-level data from developing countries.
This article contributes to the ongoing debate by examining the relationship between trade reform and industrial efficiency in Peru, focusing on the impact of the reform and liberalization program initiated in 1990 after many years of import substitution industrialization. Our article is unique in that we use a new panel data set and introduce to the literature a nonparametric, mathematical programming methodology that allows us to estimate time-varying, producerspecific efficiency levels. It is important to study efficiency dynamics because our data set spans a period in which Peru's policies toward protectionism changed dramatically. We study Peru because the empirical evidence concerning the relationship between trade reform and industrial efficiency in developing countries is not definitive; most studies confirm a positive link, but some have failed to detect such a connection. Peru should provide a valuable test about the generalizability of the well-studied Chilean case (see, for example, Tybout, de Melo, and Corbo 1991 and Liu 1993) .
I. THE DISMANTLING OF PROTECTIONISM IN PERU
Peru was one of the last Latin American countries to abandon import substitution industrialization as a development strategy. Import substitution was designed to protect domestic "infant" manufacturing industries from imports through the use of protective instruments, such as tariffs, quotas, exchange rate controls, and price and wage controls. The death knell for this policy sounded with the presidential election of Alberto Fujimori, who took office in July 1990 and implemented a far-reaching neoliberal reform package.
Other leaders of Peru had attempted to introduce neoliberal reforms, but never completed those reforms. The Belaúnde administration substantially reduced tariffs on imports.
2 In January 1981 the maximum tariff fell from 60 to 35 percent and then to 32 percent. By the end of 1981, 98 percent of all registered items could be imported without a duty, up from only 38 percent in 1978. The government relaxed regulation of foreign investment and announced plans to privatize state-owned enterprises. The impact on domestic industry was severe: manufacturing output fell nearly 20 percent between 1980 and 1983, and idle capacity in manufacturing rose to more than 54 percent. Bowing to strong pressure from Peruvian industrialists, the Belaúnde administration abandoned the reform package and restored nominal tariff rates to their levels before the reform.
The García government was characterized by populist policymaking, heterodox stabilization, and a continuation of import substitution industrializa-tion. Saavedra Chanduvi (1996: 2) provides a concise and accurate description of the Peruvian industrial sector at the end of the García government:
The Peruvian manufacturing sector developed for three decades sheltered by a set of tariff and nontariff barriers that permitted it to enjoy very high-and in some cases infinite-levels of protection . . . The pattern of trade and industrial production were so distant from that dictated by comparative advantage that Peru came to produce automobiles and computers for the internal market.
The Fujimori government took the first step toward dismantling import substitution industrialization in October 1990 by consolidating tariff categories. The number of tariff categories dropped from 56 to 3, with rates of 15, 25, and 50 percent. In March 1991 these rates were reduced further to 5, 15, and 25 percent, with 82 percent of all goods subject to the 15 percent rate. The magnitude of the reform is revealed by the decline in average tariff rates, which fell from 66 percent in July 1990 to 17 percent in March 1991 (Escobal 1992 and Saavedra Chanduvi 1996) .
The mean effective rate of protection fell from more than 90 percent in July 1990 to 36 percent in December 1990 and then to less than 30 percent in March 1991-the month that additional structural reforms were added to the reform package (table 1) . Disaggregated by three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, the percentage declines in effective rates of protection between July 1990 and March 1991 are impressive, falling almost 98 percent for nonferrous metals, 81 percent for clothing, 79 percent for other chemical products, and 76 percent for furniture. The smallest decline was in iron and steel production, although the drop was still 22 percent. The mean decline was 63 percent. Also notable, the standard deviation of the effective rates of protection fell from more than 70 percent in July 1990 to less than 20 percent in March 1991.
Although tariff reform was the major departure from import substitution, other key elements of the 1990 reform package included removal of wage and price controls, increases in the prices of and elimination of subsidies to public services, reduction in public sector employment, unification of a multiple exchange rate system, efforts to increase tax collection, elimination of restrictions on capital flows, and liberalization of interest rates (Quijandría 1995) . In 1991 and 1992 many of these reforms were deepened: the government removed interest rate ceilings on dollar-denominated deposits and loans, instituted a private pension system, and created an agency to regulate the behavior of private firms and protect consumers' rights.
II. THEORETICAL LINKS BETWEEN TRADE REGIME AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY
There are many arguments explaining why more open trade regimes lead to more efficient industrial production. Perhaps the most basic is that returns to entrepreneurial effort increase as exposure to foreign competition rises (Corden 1974 , Martin and Page 1983 , and Tybout 1992a . A second argument is that increasing returns to scale imply lower costs per unit as output increases (Pack 1988 and Tybout 1992a) . For this argument to be complete, however, a reduction in protectionism must be accompanied by an increase in domestic outputa conclusion that is far from certain, since increased competition may force producers to exit instead of expand (Tybout 1992a) .
Several authors (Pack 1988 , Grossman and Helpman 1991 , and Edwards 1992 argue that greater openness may accelerate developing countries' adoption of technological innovations originating in industrial countries. From the viewpoint of the new growth theory the creation of larger markets through trade liberaliza- tion (and market-based exchange rates) will raise demand for products, leading to more investment in product development and innovation (Tybout 1992a) . 3 Two other effects may be important: share effects and residual effects. If more efficient plants gain market share as a result of exposure to foreign competition, industrywide efficiency should rise, even if no scale economies are present (Bond 1986 , Roberts and Tybout 1991 , and Tybout and Westbrook 1995 . Tybout and Westbrook (1995) coin the term "residual" effects, noting that this "catchall category" includes capacity utilization, externalities, learning-by-doing, and managerial effort. 4 III. EMPIRICAL LINKS BETWEEN TRADE REGIME AND EFFICIENCY Two approaches, mirroring two different techniques for measuring productivity, have been used to test empirically for a relationship between the type of trade regime and industrial productivity: studies of total factor productivity (TFP), usually based on secondary data sources available at the one-or two-digit SIC level, and estimations of production functions using plant-level data.
Total Factor Productivity Studies
Several studies have estimated TFP and linked its evolution to changes in trade regime. One of the earliest is by Michaely (1975) , who finds a correlation between the reduction in quantitative restrictions and increased TFP in Israel in the mid-1950s. Nishimizu and Robinson (1986) decompose TFP growth into the shares accounted for by the expansion of domestic demand, the expansion of exports, and import substitution. They use data from Japan, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, and Yugoslavia for subperiods between 1955 and 1973. Their results are intriguing: although domestic demand accounts for the largest share of TFP growth for all countries in all subperiods, export expansion frequently plays an important role. Import substitution, in contrast, contributes negatively to growth in most cases.
More recently, Edwards (1994) calculates differences in TFP growth between 1987-91 and 1978-82 for manufacturing sectors in six Latin American countries. Although he warns against inferring causal relationships, he does remark that Chile and Costa Rica, the two countries that began trade reform earliest among the six, had the largest increases in the rate of TFP growth. 5 Haddad, de Melo, and Horton (1996) study the productivity of Moroccan manufacturing sectors following a modest and gradual reform process aimed at heightening competition and improving technical efficiency. Despite data limitations, the authors find evidence suggesting that TFP grew as a result of the reform program. In an 3. However, entrepreneurs may be less likely to develop new products because trade liberalization makes available a wider variety of imported substitutes (Tybout 1992a) . 4. They also include technological innovation in this class, but we follow Edwards (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) , who include it as a separate class.
5. The other four countries in the study are Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, and Uruguay.
effort to determine the robustness of the positive link between trade liberalization and economic performance, Edwards (1997) uses several estimation techniques, time periods, functional forms, and measures of openness. He extends his analysis to include 93 countries and finds that countries with greater trade barriers experienced slower productivity growth. As Edwards (1994) points out, one drawback of TFP studies is their aggregate nature, which may obscure diverse sectoral responses to trade policy. 6 Furthermore, as Pack (1988) and Havrylyshyn (1990) observe, TFP studies have presented mixed results. Havrylyshyn (1990:10) sums up this problem:
The evidence [on the relationship between trade reform and efficiency] from studies of TFP is weak and ambiguous. Some evidence of positive links between trade policy and productivity growth certainly exists . . . But many cases . . . are ambiguous, and some suggest a negative relation.
Production Function Studies
The second major approach to investigating the relationship between trade policy and industrial efficiency calls for estimating plant-level production functions, deriving estimates of efficiency from those functions, and examining the links between the efficiency estimates and trade policy. Tybout, de Melo, and Corbo (1991) estimate deterministic production functions at the three-digit SIC level for Chile for the years 1967 and 1979 . From the production function parameters, they create SIC-level indexes of efficiency levels and dispersion of efficiency levels with 1967 as the base year. They find that reductions in tariff protection are correlated with increases in efficiency and decreases in the variance of efficiency scores. The authors conclude that additional plant-level studies-using panel data and other trade liberalization events-must be performed to help verify their findings. Tybout and Westbrook (1995) use a similar technique to analyze reform in Mexico. They estimate production and cost functions for 1984 (before trade reforms were implemented) and for 1990 (after reforms were implemented) and then use correlation analysis to determine whether changes in efficiency at the three-digit SIC level are correlated with changes in various measures of trade policy.
In addition to deterministic measures of efficiency, stochastic frontier production functions have been a popular technique for estimating production technologies. Early efforts use cross-sectional data collected before and after liberalization to examine changes in efficiency levels. Handoussa, Nishimizu, and Page (1986) , for example, find significant increases in technical efficiency among Egyptian public sector firms during a period of trade liberalization beginning in 1973. More recent work has taken advantage of the availability of firm-level panel data. Liu (1993) , for example, assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function and, using panel data for 1979-86 from Chile, finds that the mean efficiency levels of surviving plants tend to be higher than those of exiting plants. 7 By and large, production function approaches have produced empirical results confirming that trade liberalization improves efficiency (Havrylyshyn 1990 ).
IV. DATA
The data we use to estimate plant-level efficiency were provided by the Peruvian Ministry of Industry, Tourism, Integration, and International Trade Negotiations (MITINCI), which conducts an annual survey of manufacturing plants with more than 20 employees.
9 Our data cover 1988-92-two years before and two years after the implementation of economic reform in July 1990. The coverage of the survey is reasonably good since completion was obligatory.
Our output variable is the value of total production. We use six inputs as explanatory variables: capital stock, raw materials, electricity, payments for industrial services, and blue-and white-collar workers.
10 All of the data are recorded in value terms with the exception of the labor variables. Capital stock is the value reported for the end of the previous calendar year, and workers are measured in physical (not efficiency) units. Tybout (1992b) points out that firmlevel data on capital stocks of developing countries may be subject to measurement error. To check the consistency of the capital measure in our data set, we calculate capital-to-output ratios (K/Q) for all establishments. There were some unrealistic ratios, so we dropped the observations corresponding to the largest and smallest 10 percent of all K/Q values from the sample. 11 7. Liu's classification of exiting, entering, and surviving firms is based on "intertemporal patterns of missing values for each plant" (Liu 1993:220) . Thus if a plant exits the sample and does not reappear, it is classified as an exiting plant. However, this plant just may have stopped filing information while continuing to produce. Similarly, entering plants may be survivors that did not file in preceding years. Still, there is no superior panel data set for Latin American industries.
8. Pack (1988:372) dissents from this view. 9. MITINCI, Estadística manufacturera, datos a nivel de establecimiento (various years). To our knowledge, we are the first researchers to be given access to these data.
10. We do not use other input categories reported in the data set, such as fuel, replacement parts and accessories, and containers, because there are many missing values. We deflate all of the variables, except for labor, using data obtained from MITINCI, Estadística industrial mensual (various years). The MITINCI deflators were available for 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1993 ; deflators for 1991 and 1992 had not been processed so we have interpolated to obtain them. Since price deflators are not available at the firm level, some of the measured cross-firm variation in productivity is capturing firm-specific variation in prices; without firm-level price indexes, we cannot address this problem. (This observation was contributed by an anonymous referee.) 11. Tybout (1992b) provides a more elegant, econometric solution to this measurement error problem. He uses indirect least squares to instrument for capital. Applying this method to five Chilean manufacturing industries, he finds that, although the relative sizes of the input coefficients change, returns to scale are not affected. Unfortunately, Tybout's solution is not feasible in the nonparametric, mathematical programming framework we use here. However, by retaining the middle 80 percent of observations, we attempt to reduce the influence of outliers without introducing bias. This approach may affect parameter estimates and the level of efficiency but should not influence temporal patterns, the main focus of our investigation. To test this observation, we also perform our analysis using all observations and find that each dependent variable maintained the same (direct or inverse) relationship with efficiency as is observed with the filtered data (see section VI).
V. METHODOLOGY
To measure the level of technical efficiency in Peruvian industries, we use the linear programming method of data envelopment analysis. This method compares an entity's observed level of performance with its theoretically possible level of performance. This best-practice level of performance is determined by creating a production frontier based on the firms that produce the largest amount of output(s) for a given level of input(s) or, conversely, those that minimize the amount of input(s) needed to produce given levels of output(s).
Efficiency Measurement
The production technology, S, is defined as all feasible combinations of inputs and outputs, feasible meaning that the combination of inputs is able to produce the levels of outputs. For each point in time t = 1, . . ., T, there are n = 1, . . ., N firms, each consuming j = 1, . . ., J inputs to produce k = 1, . . ., K outputs. Thus x jnt is the amount of input j used by firm n in period t, and y knt is the level of output k produced by firm n in period t. All input and output observations are positive. Assuming a contemporaneous production set, for each time period t, input and output observations from only that time period are used; separate production frontiers are calculated for each industry.
As an example, assume that there is only one time period. In a one-input, oneoutput activity, S may be illustrated as in figure 1. Efficiency measures are calculated as the distance, λ, from each point to the efficiency frontier. An outputbased distance function, OD, is defined as: (1) OD(x,y) = min{λ | (x, y/λ) ∈ S}.
Holding the input vector x constant, this expression expands the output vector y as much as possible without exceeding the boundaries of S. If a firm is outputefficient, it has a value of 1 for this expression, whereas if it is output-inefficient, the value is less than 1.
Data Envelopment Analysis
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) first introduced data envelopment analysis to the economics literature; it has since found multiple applications. One reason that these studies have proliferated is that linear programming methods, in general, do not require price information. This is an empirical advantage since often the only data available are physical units of inputs and outputs. It also has widespread appeal because it requires neither the assumption of cost minimization or profit maximization nor the specification of a production function. Since data envelopment analysis is nonparametric, it does not confound the effects of inefficiency with misspecification of the functional form, a significant problem of parametric production function approaches.
13 Furthermore, it is able to compute the relative efficiency of each firm under study, which may have multiple inputs and outputs, with any software program that has linear programming capabilities.
Data envelopment analysis, as its name suggests, envelopes observed production points. It creates a flexible piecewise linear approximation to model the best-practice reference technology. It is flexible in that constraints can be placed on the linear program to account for constant, decreasing, increasing, or variable returns to scale. Radial measures of levels of technical efficiency can then be developed for firms that operate inside the convex hull of the data.
We obtain the efficiency score in outputs or, equivalently, the value of the output distance function for an observation of input(s) and output(s) for firm m at time t, (x mt , y mt ), from the following linear programming model: 13. Data envelopment analysis does, however, have its own weakness: because it is nonstochastic, it cannot distinguish between noise and technical inefficiency, like the stochastic frontiers methodology (Lovell 1993). where the w n s are intensity weights that allow the comparison of convex combinations of data points with firm m observed in period t. The assumption of a convex polyhedral cone made here implies constant returns to scale. 14 In the simple hypothetical one-period, one-input, one-output, six-firm example, this process creates a production technology frontier (figure 1). Firms b and e define the frontier. They are efficient and have scores of 1. The other firms, which lie beneath the frontier, are inefficient and have scores less than 1. The farther away from the frontier a firm lies, the less efficient it is relative to the bestpractice firms and the lower is its technical efficiency score. Firm a's outputbased score, for example, is the vertical distance between it and the frontier, which is given by the ratio (OA/OB) < 1. If this number equals 0.4, firm a is only 40 percent efficient relative to the best-practice frontier. Holding the input constant, firm a's output could be increased 150 percent. An efficient firm a would produce at a point on the frontier that is a linear combination of processes used by firms b and e.
VI. RESULTS OF THE DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
We carry out the linear programming operation (equation 2) using the total value of production as the output (k = 1) and electricity, raw materials, blue-and white-collar workers, payments for industrial services, and capital stock as inputs (j = 6). A total of 6,473 linear programming problems are solved.
Comparison of Efficiency Levels
The industries with the lowest unweighted mean efficiencies were electric accessories and instruments for domestic use (SIC 383) in 1988 and 1989, food products excluding beverages (SIC 311) in 1990 and 1991, and beverages and tobacco (SIC 313) in 1992 (table 2) . Electric accessories and instruments for domestic use reported the lowest unweighted mean score in 1988-the industry was only 39 percent efficient. The lowest unweighted mean score grew to 54 percent in 1989, 57 percent in 1990, and 70 percent in 1991, before falling to 68 percent in 1992. Out of 20 industries, 15 registered increases in their unweighted mean efficiency scores between 1988 and 1992.
The weighted mean efficiency scores put more weight on scores from plants with higher output levels. In 1988-90 the sectors that had the lowest weighted mean efficiency scores were the same as those that had the lowest unweighted scores. In 1991, however, plastic products (SIC 356) had the lowest weighted mean efficiency score, and in 1992 food products excluding beverages (SIC 311) had the lowest score. The lowest weighted mean efficiency score was 43 percent in 1988, 62 percent in 1989, 75 percent in 1990, 77 percent in 1991, and 81 percent in 14. Various restrictions on the sum of the w n s result in nonincreasing (∑ n w n ≤ 1), nondecreasing (∑ n w n ≥ 1), or variable (∑ n w n = 1) returns to scale. For further details see Seiford and Thrall (1990) and Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1985) . We assume constant returns to scale in this study, since this restriction was tested on this data set and not rejected. Table 2 . Classification, Peru, 1988 -92 1988 1989 1990 Number Un-Output-Number Un-Output-Number Un-Output-Number Un-Output-Number Un-Output- In almost all cases-the sole exception being nonferrous metals (SIC 372) in 1988-the output-weighted means were higher than the unweighted means for 1988 and 1992. In general, the more efficient firms were producing more of the output and, hence, the output-weighted means were higher than simple averages.
Unweighted and Output-Weighted Mean Efficiency Scores by Standard Industrial
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Trade liberalization should reduce the dispersion of efficiency scores within a given sector and-to the extent that tariff rates in different sectors convergeamong sectors. First, consider the possibility of efficiency scores converging among sectors. The difference between the highest and lowest unweighted mean scores declined substantially between 1988 and 1992. This was also the case for weighted mean scores. In fact, the decline in the spread between highest and lowest scores was identical for weighted and unweighted means: from 57 to 29 percent between 1988 and 1992. 15 Second, consider the issue of convergence within sectors. The standard deviation of the unweighted efficiency scores declined in 14 of 20 industries (table 3) . 16 
Determinants of Mean Efficiency Scores
In addition to comparing efficiency levels among industries and over time, we are also interested in the determinants of these efficiency scores. For our analysis we use mean efficiency scores, as opposed to individual-plant efficiency scores, because the data set does not contain plant-level data other than inputs and outputs.
17 Thus we are limited to an aggregate analysis of the determinants of sectoral efficiency. We explore two possible determinants of efficiency at the three-digit SIC level: commercial policy and industrial structure. Commercial policy is measured by rates of effective protection; these data are produced by the Peruvian Central Bank. Industrial structure is measured by the Herfindahl index of industrial concentration, calculated from the same data set used to produce the data envelopment analysis efficiency scores.
Before presenting our econometric results, a word of caution is in order. Other important macroeconomic events in Peru between 1988 and 1992-exchange rate overvaluation, hyperinflation, changes in the real interest rate-could overwhelm the effects of changes in trade policy and market structure. In addition, our data have potential econometric problems: price indexes may be biased over time because of hyperinflation, and some variables, especially capital stock, may be measured with error. These econometric problems further complicate the at-15. Page (1980) , for example, has a more detailed data source and is able to use experience of entrepreneurs, age of the plant, and education level of the plant's labor force as regressors.
16. This decline was due almost entirely to the rise in the mean of the least-efficient industry, since the highest mean score was already close to 100 percent.
17. We do not report standard deviations calculated on the basis of output-weighted efficiency scores in table 3, because shifts in output to more efficient firms may increase the standard deviation rather than lower it. In other words, because of the weighting procedure, the standard deviation now reflects two factors: the standard deviation per se and the distribution of output. Only the former is of interest as a test of convergence. Table 3 . Standard Industrial Classification, Peru, 1988-92 tempt to uncover the links among trade policy, market structure, and industrial efficiency. Despite these observations, however, it should be noted that, although all industrial sectors faced the same macroeconomic events, they were subject to different changes in trade policy and market structure. Thus although it is difficult to identify macroeconomic determinants of productivity change, since trade policy and industrial concentration are more sector-specific, their influence on productivity is easier to capture.
Standard Deviations of Unweighted Efficiency Scores by
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Industries with high effective rates of protection before stabilization still had high rates after stabilization (ρ = 0.82; table 4). This pattern also holds for industrial concentration (ρ = 0.83) and mean efficiency levels (ρ = 0.80). Both contemporaneous and lagged Herfindahl indexes are significantly positively correlated with mean efficiency levels (0.50 < ρ < 0.66). Correlations between Herfindahl scores and effective rates of protection are negative but generally insignificant; the same is true for correlations between effective rates of protection and mean efficiency levels. Correlations between effective rates of protection and standard deviations are positive (as expected) for the unweighted case and negative for the standard deviations calculated on the basis of output-weighted means (see note 16).
To test whether there is a relationship among industrial concentration, effective rates of protection, and efficiency at the industry level, we perform several regressions. We hypothesize that higher levels of industrial concentration and effective rates of protection are associated with lower efficiency scores. The logic behind the first inverse relationship is that the smaller is the Herfindahl index, the less concentrated and more competitive is the industry, which should lead to greater efficiency. The reasoning behind the second inverse relationship is that, as effective rates of protection decline with trade liberalization, increased competition compels firms to become more efficient.
We also include a third covariate: the square root of the number of plants in each sector, ͱN -. Caves and Barton (1990) show a link between the number of firms used to estimate technical efficiency and the resulting efficiency score. The expected relationship is an inverse one, which at first appears counterintuitive, since one might expect that, as the number of firms increases, competition increases, driving average efficiency upward. What is actually occurring, however, is a purely statistical phenomenon: as the number of observations drawn from a distribution increases, so do the number of extreme values (both high and low). Caves and Barton (1990:60) argue that the relationship between estimated technical efficiency and the number of observations may be similarly linked. In other words, the more draws taken from a distribution, the more likely the researcher is to encounter a highly efficient plant, which makes all other plants in the sample less efficient in comparison. Caves and Barton observe that the range of efficiency values increases at a rate close to ͱN -. Thus we estimate our equations with and without this regressor.
18. Tybout, de Melo, and Corbo (1991) We are able to calculate efficiency scores for plants in 25 sectors, but three-wood and cork products (SIC 332), glass and glass products (SIC 362), and the manufacture of professional, scientific, and measurement and control equipment including photographic equipment and optics (SIC 385)-do not have data on effective rates of protection. We dropped two other industries-footwear (SIC 324) and transport equipment (SIC 384)-because we were unable to obtain deflators for these classifications. Thus there are 20 observations for each year. Also the earliest year for which we could obtain effective rates of protection is 1990; therefore our regressions cannot go back to 1988 or 1989. We also do not have effective rates of protection for 1992, so we must use 1991 as the postreform year. Clearly, this will tend to understate the efficiency gains resulting from liberalization, since firms will not have adjusted completely to the change in regime by the end of 1991.
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REGRESSION RESULTS. In the absence of the ͱN -regressor, the results of the regression using 1990 data (table 5, column 1) provide no support for our hypothesis. Although the coefficient on trade protection is negative (indicating that industries with higher levels of protection have lower mean efficiency scores), it is not statistically significant. The coefficient on industrial concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index, is statistically significant, but its sign is the opposite of what we would expect: more concentrated industries have higher efficiency scores.
However, once we control for the statistical factor identified by Caves and Barton, the results do support our hypothesis (table 5, column 2). All three coefficients have the expected negative sign, the effective rate of protection is significant at the 10 percent level, and ͱN -is significant at less than 1 percent. The coefficient on the Herfindahl index, although not significant at standard levels, is suggestive of an inverse relationship. Note that ͱN -and the Herfindahl index are significantly, inversely related (ρ = -0.61 and -0.66 for 1990 and 1991, respectively) . This high degree of collinearity makes it difficult to isolate the link between market concentration and efficiency and, hence, may explain why the Herfindahl coefficient has a higher p-value.
The results for 1991 tell a similar, although less striking, story. The signs on the regressors are negative, but only ͱN -is statistically significant (table 5, column 4). Again, if ͱN -is not included (table 5, column 3), the effective rate of protection is insignificant, and the Herfindahl index, although significant, has the wrong sign. 19. In terms of the sign of each parameter estimate, the results are the same whether we use the complete data set or the 80 percent subset. However, with the complete data set the parameter estimates, although similar in magnitude, are typically lower, and most are not significant. By using the 80 percent subset, we thus are able to measure more precisely the relationship between trade reform and efficiency, which is obscured when outliers are present.
20. An alternative interpretation of the Herfindahl index is as a measure of the underlying differences in efficiency within the industry: efficient plants get larger, resulting in higher concentration. This is a possible explanation for its positive sign. Note also that the Herfindahl index can be written as the sum of a "variance equivalent" (or dispersion component that measures the within-industry variance in size) and the inverse of a "numbers equivalent" (or numbers component that equals 1 over the number of firms).
In order to determine if the parameter estimates are insignificant because of the high degree of collinearity, we run a regression pooling the data for both 1990 and 1991 (table 5, columns 5 and 6). As expected, with twice as many observations, all of the coefficients in the pooled regression can be measured more precisely and become significant. They also have the expected sign (when ͱN -is omitted, the point estimates are significant, but, again, Herfindahl has the incorrect sign). These results suggest that the expected relationship among market structure, trade reform, and efficiency does exist, but it is hard to detect unless there is a sufficient number of observations so that ordinary least squares can separate out the effects of individual regressors on efficiency.
The fact that the econometric results are stronger for 1990 than for 1991 should not be surprising. Almost 30 years of import substitution industrialization produced a strong negative relationship between rates of effective protection and efficiency levels. In the year spanning 1990 and 1991, firms may not have adjusted completely to the new tariff structure. There are several reasons for such a delayed response. The first reason is the credibility of the reform-past governThis would explain why, when we include both ͱN -and the Herfindahl index, the coefficient on ͱN -is negative. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for these observations. To test if firms were taking a wait-and-see attitude to the policy change, we run one additional regression (table 5, columns 7 and 8). We regress mean efficiency scores from 1992 on the values of the covariates in 1991. All of the coefficients have the expected sign; ͱN -remains significant (at the 2 percent level), and the effective rate of protection becomes significant (at the 10 percent level). Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficient on the effective rate of protection increases considerably relative to the 1990 regressions: it is -0.051 when we use 1990 covariates and 1990 efficiency measures (table 5, column 2), and it is -0.189 when we use 1991 covariates and 1992 efficiency measures (table 5, column 8) . Thus it appears that, before reform, there is a link between tariffs and efficiency, and this effect grows after reform. Furthermore, this relationship exhibits a lag; one year after reform, firms have had an opportunity to respond to the drastically different tariff structure.
It is certainly possible that the adjustment back to a stable relationship is ongoing; it is likely that plants did not respond in earnest until several years after the reform. It would be interesting to extend our analysis to later years to determine if mean efficiencies have continued to change and if the magnitude of the response increased in the long run. But, unfortunately, our data end in 1992, so we cannot analyze this disequilibrium story further. SURVIVING AND EXITING FIRMS. Because we also are interested in how trade liberalization affects efficiency at the plant level, we separate the observations into surviving and exiting plants, following Liu's (1993) We also want to determine if relatively inefficient plants improved their performance following trade reform. For such an analysis we need firms that were present both before and after the reform. We select 1988 as the prereform period (we pick the earliest time period in order to maximize the amount of time that plants had to adjust) and 1991 and 1992 as the postreform period. This limits 21. Plants that did not fall into any of these categories were dropped from the analysis. Unfortunately, there is no other way to identify surviving and exiting firms in our or Liu's data set. See note 7. our analysis to surviving plants and plants that did not exit until 1992. On average, 65 percent of plants that exited in 1992 improved or maintained their 1988 efficiency level; for surviving plants, approximately 70 percent on average had an efficiency score after reform that was at least as high as that before reform (69 percent when 1988 is compared to 1991 and 71 percent when 1988 is compared to 1992). 22 VII. CONCLUSIONS Our goal for this article was to determine if the Peruvian stabilization and reform package of 1990 led to increased technical efficiency in Peru's manufacturing industries. We found evidence that it did, once we controlled for the number of firms in each sector and distribution of market share.
22. Note that technical efficiency is a relative measure, with the highest level of efficiency equal to 100 percent. We established in the previous paragraph that survivors have higher average technical efficiency than exiting firms. What this means is that firms that are already very efficient (they have high technical efficiency or they define the frontier and have 100 percent efficiency) have less room for improvement, while firms that have low relative efficiency have greater room for improvement. In other words, survivors may not show dramatically greater improvement over time simply because they are already operating at a higher level of efficiency. Thus between 65 and 70 percent of plants in both cohorts (survivors and exiting plants) maintain or improve their efficiency over time. for 1988, 1988-89, 1988-90, and 1988-91. b. Surviving plants are those that operated over the entire sample period, 1988-92. Source: Authors' calculations.
This article presented new micro-level evidence regarding the connection between trade policy decisions and industrial sector efficiency. It contributes to the existing literature in several respects. First, it is one of only a few studies that has examined this issue at the plant level. Second, it is the only study to address the effect of trade reform on efficiency in Peru, because we are the first authors granted access to Peruvian industrial sector survey data. Since the panel covers a period during which there was a dramatic shift in policy, we were able to detect a positive relationship between tariff reduction and efficiency gains despite data difficulties. Third, this is one of only a handful of studies that are based on panel data and hence able to follow individual plants through time. However, limited access to quality trade policy measures prevented us from fully exploiting the panel nature of the data. Finally, by using a nonparametric approach to measure efficiency, we mitigated the problems associated with a priori model specification. Using linear programming techniques to develop indexes of efficiency and then decomposing variations in these indexes into sources that control for trade policy and industrial structure may be a powerful method for analyzing such interventions in other countries that have implemented trade and domestic policy reforms.
Additional insights into the dynamics of the efficiency frontier can be obtained by undertaking a productivity study using the Malmquist index, which decomposes observed productivity changes into technological changes (shifts in the frontier) and efficiency changes (movements of firms relative to the frontier). Such a study is on our future research agenda.
